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Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is a theory of war that 
attempts to maximize the benefit of linking together, or 
networking, operating forces.  The Navy and Marine Corps 
have decided to attempt to instantiate this warfighting 
concept through FORCEnet.  The FORCEnet concept is 
ambitious, but most current efforts have looked to ensure 
the ability to connect and share data without addressing 
the larger picture of how to move information within a 
netted force in order to maximize the benefit of 
information sharing.  This thesis presents an information 
topology developed to effectively share information across 
a variety of force compositions.  In order to fully attain 
the benefits of a networked force, a complementary command 
and control system must also be designed.  This thesis also 
outlines a command and control system that can be employed 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AREA OF RESEARCH  
The purpose of this research is to design an 
information topology for FORCEnet that delivers information 
to a Decision Maker in order to gain a Decision Making 
Advantage.  In addition, this paper will identify some gaps 
in current technologies and emerging technologies that may 
fill those gaps.  In addition, this thesis will show how 
the proposed information topology will support Network 
Centric Warfare principles and how it would be employed. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How should FORCEnet be organized so that information 
can flow effectively and efficiently and be delivered to 
the right person at the right time in the right format?  
What command and control structure or decision making 
organization will best capitalize on the FORCEnet 
information structure to ensure that warfighting 




As part of Sea Power 21, the US Navy has decided to 
move toward Network Centric Warfare as its future war 
fighting concept.  The concept is based on the idea of 
rapid information sharing via robust communications, and 
draws it power from the ability to link together, or 
network, a military force.1  The concept of self-
synchronization of forces was the major principle on how to 
                     
1David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, Network 
Centric Warfare. (Washington: Department of Defense, 1999), 93-94. 
2 
change the way a Net-Centric force would fight2, but later 
works have added the idea of swarming3 which has gained 
popularity in the last few years. 
a. Self-synchronization 
Self-synchronization is founded on the concept 
that empowered units with the same view of the battlespace 
and the same understanding of the commander’s intent can 
laterally coordinate and prosecute the battle with minimal 
input from higher command levels4.  This idea is not 
entirely new, and examples include the German army of World 
War II who used a similar concept of mission orders and 
commander’s intent to allow their units to quickly and 
decisively fight.  Also, the US Marines have adopted a 
similar concept in their Maneuver Warfare Doctrine.  The 
goal of self-synchronization is that small, independent 
units can act together as a coherent force with “big 
picture” guidance to achieve common goals.  This allows a 
faster pace of operations because forward units do not need 
to wait for instructions from higher headquarters, and 
faster actions on the battlefield will translate into 
decisive victories.  This thesis will look at the 
possibility of self-synchronization, which hinges on 
information sharing and the belief that given the same 
picture of the battlefield, different leaders will come to 
a common solution. 
 
                     
2
 Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, “Network Centric Warfare: 
Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, 
January 1998 
3
 Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War. (New York: The Free Press, 
2003), 100-118 
4David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, Network 
Centric Warfare. (Washington: Department of Defense, 1999), 175-176. 
3 
b. Swarming 
Swarming is simply bringing together disparate 
forces at a decisive place to mass their effects, and then 
withdrawing them back to a dispersed disposition.  Swarming 
relies heavily on robust, effective communications.  Small, 
disparate forces need to be able to communicate reliably, 
and often covertly, in order to affect a swarm-like attack.  
Again, this is not a new concept and is encapsulated in the 
Marine Maneuver Warfare doctrine in the form of massed 
fires replacing massed forces, although to a lesser degree 
than espoused in the principles of Network Centric Warfare.  
The advantage of using a swarming force is that troops and 
equipment no longer need to mass for long periods of time 
in order to achieve combat power.  Instead the mass their 
effects at the decisive point on the battlefield and then 
disperse so that the enemy does not have a large center of 
gravity to attack.  Modern sensors, targeting, and weapons 
make massing of troops a very dangerous proposition.  It is 
widely recognized that massed troops and equipment will be 
targeted and destroyed.  The ability to keep forces 
dispersed aids in concealment of forces, as well as 
survivability of forces when attacked.  Another advantage 
of swarming that is not commonly discussed is that 
dispersed forces need not be of the same type.  Forces from 
different services, countries, agencies, or specialties can 
be quickly brought together to achieve a specific mission 
then quickly dispersed.  These forces are regularly called 
“ad hoc teams” and are expected to be integral to combat in 
the future.5 
 
                     
5




The US Navy has decided to operationalize Network 
Centric Warfare through a concept known as FORCEnet.  
Unfortunately, FORCEnet is a concept that is poorly defined 
and often means different things to different people.  Sea 
Power 21 defines FORCEnet as  
the “glue” that binds together Sea Strike, Sea 
Shield, and Sea Basing.  It is the operational 
construct and architectural framework for naval 
warfare in the information age, integrating 
warriors, sensors, command and control, 
platforms, and weapons into a networked, 
distributed combat force.6 
Although this definition is fairly clear and breaks out the 
potential power of FORCEnet (as evidenced by the Army’s 
definition of LANDWARNET which is nearly identical7), it 
does not spell out how FORCEnet will be developed or 
employed.  Nor does it address how FORCEnet will facilitate 
Network Centric Warfare.  So what does FORCEnet really do 
for us?  How does it improve the way we fight as naval 
services?  Should it be separate from the Army and Air 
Force equivalents? 
The first problem with answering the above questions 
is that FORCEnet is not a thing.  It is not a program, 
system, or piece of equipment that can be identified.  It 
is a concept for operationalizing Network Centric Warfare.  
Much of the current work in instantiating FORCEnet at the 
DOD contractor and Systems Command level involves 
connectivity, bandwidth, and data fusion concerns.  
Although these are important elements of building any 
                     
6
 Adm. Vern Clark, “Sea Power 21,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval 
Institute, October, 2002 
7
 LANDWARNET Brief, Futures Center, Training and Doctrine Command, 
given February, 2004 
5 
computer network, better connectivity and formatted data do 
not equal Network Centric Warfare by themselves.   
Most work in the data integration area has had to do 
with compatible computing schemes and has largely 
overlooked analysis problems.  Modern sensors and data 
mining programs can produce overwhelming volumes of data, 
and analysts and commanders are in danger of being 
presented with more information than any one human can 
process.  Computer aided analysis and integration tools can 
help with the data overload problem, but filtering software 
and procedures may become more important.  Simply making 
more information available will not aid the decision making 
process.  Advances in Human System Integration have helped 
this problem, but little real progress has been made.  The 
data overload problem will continue to get worse as more 
information is put into the system.   
Lastly, and most importantly, almost no work has been 
put into the information topology of the network.  For 
example, a sensor field gets a hit; where does it send the 
information?  Why?  Who decides?  There are many answers to 
this fundamental question, but they are all based on 
opinions and not analysis.  This paper will add some 
reasoned analysis to this problem. 
Fundamentally, what is FORCEnet, and why do we need 
it?  FORCEnet is, in part, an information structure with 
the primary purpose of delivering tailored information to 
the Decision Maker, whoever that may be.  The structure 
must be able to aid Decision Makers at all levels, from the 
Strategic Commander, to the Marine on the ground who 
decides whether or not to pull the trigger.  To build this 
type of structure, the Navy and Marine Corps need to look 
6 
at how people handle information now, and how they want the 
system to handle information in the future. 
D. ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE OF THESIS 
Chapter II covers the current body of literature on 
Network Centric Warfare, FORCEnet policy, and the state of 
emerging technologies relevant to FORCEnet.  It will serve 
to set the background for the remaining chapters as well as 
explain some concepts that exist in the DOD regarding 
FORCEnet.  Chapter III will begin the analysis of 
information and user requirements that will drive the rest 
of the thesis.  This analysis will include the design of a 
command and control system and information topology that 
will maximize the potentials of a fully networked force.  
Chapter IV will describe how information will move between 
users in the proposed topology and how this design will 
work with existing and proposed SOP for employing NCW.  
Chapter V illustrates how the employment of the proposed 
topology will work in a combat environment. 
Building a coherent FORCEnet is an enormous task that 
is far beyond the scope of any one thesis.  This thesis 
will limit itself to defining an information topology, 
presenting a command and control concept, identifying 
technological shortfalls and potential emerging 
technologies to solve those problems, and making 
recommendations for a way forward to field FORCEnet that 
will enable of Network Centric Warfare.  To do this, this 
thesis will look at changing the way the Navy and Marine 
Corps configure their command and control systems so that 
FORCEnet can effectively work with Decision Makers to 
improve combat operations.  Finally some recommendations 
7 
for simulations and wargames will be made to ensure that 





























II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
1. Vision 
The theory of Network Centric Warfare was first put 
forward by VADM. Cebrowski and John Gartska in a January 
1998 issue of the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute.  
They originally envisioned an information network that any 
soldier, sailor, airmen, or Marine could plug into and send 
and receive relevant information.  The platforms and 
personnel would be interchangeable within the networked 
force and included sensor grids, information grids, and 
shooter grids.  They viewed this capability as a way to 
fundamentally change how U.S. forces are organized and 
employed.8  This concept slowly began to take root in the 
U.S. Navy, and became official doctrine when Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote it into the Defense Planning 
Guidance.9 
Network Centric Warfare has come to be associated with 
Effects Based Operations, largely because both have roots 
in network analysis.  Effects Based Operations is a theory 
of warfare that proposes that small, properly targeted 
actions can have large scale effects.  EBO attempts to use 
nodal analysis to determine a desired outcome and walk 
backward through a complex network to determine which nodes 
can be targeted to achieve the desired outcome.10  Although 
                     
8
 Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, “Network Centric Warfare: 
Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, 
January 1998 
9
 Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War. (New York: The Free Press, 
2003), 113. 
10
 Edward A. Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network 
Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War. (Washington: The Department 
of Defense). 
10 
EBO and NCW share some common language and grew out of 
similar field of study, they are fundamentally different 
theories of warfare that have some overlap but are not 
dependant on each other.  Both theories focus on the 
relationships between nodes and how parts of networks 
interact, but apply these relationships in different ways.  
It is important to recognize that the two theories neither 
rely upon each other, nor are mutually exclusive.  EBO 
still has some advocates in the DOD, but has recently 
fallen out of favor with many high ranking officers.  
Whether EBO can ever be operationalized is a subject of 
another work, but NCW can be employed with or without EBO. 
2. Principles 
a. Shared Situational Awareness 
One of the driving tenets of Network Centric 
Warfare is Shared Situational Awareness.  Situational 
Awareness (SA) is a detailed understanding of one’s 
environment.  On the battlefield, this includes knowledge 
of not only friendly and enemy dispositions, but plans, 
contingencies, and Commander’s Intent.  NCW asserts that if 
all personnel have a shared view of the battle space, they 
can achieve Shared Situational Awareness.  Advocates of NCW 
assert that commonly trained units with Shared Situation 
Awareness should be able to self-synchronize and come to a 
common course of action.  This assertion and self-
synchronization are explored in more detail below. 
b. Migration of Control 
Shared Situational Awareness allows commanders 
closest to the action to have a complete picture and take 
action in a rapid manner.  To achieve and maintain a fast 
tempo of operations, it is important to allow forward 
commanders the freedom to take action at their discretion.  
11 
This process is known as migration of control or delegation 
of authority.  Control of forces will migrate from the 
higher echelons of command to units at the edge of battle.  
Migration of control, unlike traditional delegation of 
authority, allows the control of forces to shift laterally 
from units at similar command echelons as the battle 
changes.  This concept gives the commander in the best 
position to make effective decisions the control needed to 
be effective.11  The processes involved in migration of 
control have not been effectively defined, but the concept 
shows some promise.  An example of a similar situation is 
the migration of the control of fires during an air 
assault.  The Escort Flight Leader (EFL) begins with 
control of fires, at some point they are passed to the 
Forward Air Controller (FAC), who has the discretion to 
push and pull control to a Forward Air Controller 
(Airborne) (FAC(A)) asset.  This evolution generally runs 
smoothly because it is understood and trained to by all 
parties involved, and migration of control of the larger 
battle could follow a similar pattern. 
c. Control of Information 
Because NCW is dependant on robust and constant 
communications, there is a concern that control of forces 
will be tightly held by the most senior commander instead 
of being distributed to the forward small unit commanders.  
Senior members of both the Navy and Marine Corps have 
expressed concerns about this effect and hope to prevent 
senior officers from micromanaging the battle.  The Marines 
have suggested preventing certain flows of information 
entirely to insure that leaders are not reaching to far 
down the chain of command when they should not.  The 
                     
11
 Dr. Alexis Levis, Private Communication, 16 March, 2004. 
12 
concern is that a general officer or admiral may become 
concerned with specific tactical engagements instead of 
fighting operational battles.  The Marines are extremely 
concerned about keeping the “General’s out of the fighting 
holes.”12  Micromanagement facilitated by robust 
communications is not the desired result of NCW; in fact 
NCW espouses the opposite.  It will be important to not 
only exchange the right information while conducting NCW, 
but also to not exchange unnecessary and detrimental 
information so that junior leaders are free to take 
appropriate action in response to changing situations on 
the battlefield. 
3. Command and Control 
a. Definitions 
Command and Control are difficult terms to define 
and separate.  JCS Pub 1 defines command as the  
responsibility for effectively using available 
resources, planning the employment of, 
organizing, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling military forces for the 
accomplishment of assigned missions.  It also 
includes the responsibility for health, welfare, 
morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.13 
Alberts and Hayes note that “this definition 
subsumes control as a part of command.”14  They go on to 
discuss problems with drawing distinction between command 
and control, concluding that “much of the discussion is 
focused on a single commander, the one in charge.  In fact, 
command and control in modern warfare is a distributed 
                     
12
 Futures Department, Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(MCCDC), Private Communication, 17 March, 2004. 
13
 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms. 
14
 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge. 
(Washington: Department of Defense, 2003), 14. 
13 
responsibility.”15  They assert that forces fighting Network 
Centric Warfare no longer have a single commander 
controlling a large force, but have the responsibility for 
conducting command functions spread out over connected 
operating forces.  This view of command conflicts with the 
current system where commanders have a legal responsibility 
that cannot be delegated. 
Alberts, Gartska, and Stein say that “the very 
essence of command and control lies in the ability of the 
commander, at any level, to make the most of the 
situation.”16  They further explain that the output of 
command and control is the flow of the battle and the 
successful completion of military objectives.  Whether 
command is centralized or distributed becomes less 
important than the output of the command and control 
process.  Again, this version eliminates the requirement 
for a single commander responsible for leading forces as 
long as a desirable outcome can be achieved.  They assert 
that a Network Centric command and control process will 
give a superior output for the following reasons: 
1) decision entities or C2 elements will be 
more knowledgeable; 
2) actor entities will be more knowledgeable; 
3) actor and decision entities will be better 
connected; 
4) sensor entities will be more responsive; and 




 David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, Network 
Centric Warfare. (Washington: Department of Defense, 1999), 157. 
14 
5) the footprint of all entities will be much 
smaller.17 
The above arguments make two critical 
assumptions: access to more information will make an entity 
more knowledgeable, and more knowledgeable entities will 
take better action than less knowledgeable entities.  These 
are reasonable assumptions, but are by no means infallible.  
It is easy to make an argument that increased data does not 
equate to more knowledge.  A man with two watches is never 
sure what time it is, but a man with one watch is.  Also, 
more knowledgeable entities may not act better, especially 
if decision entities and actor entities see conflicting 
courses of action.   
b. Self-Synchronization 
Network Centric Warfare attempts to 
operationalize the idea of distributed command functions 
through the concept of self-synchronization, which is 
defined by Cebrowski and Gartska as “the ability of a well-
informed force to organize and synchronize complex warfare 
activities from the bottom up.”18  The potential value of 
this concept is hard to argue with as defined above, but 
the definition is vague and offers no understanding as to 
what exactly self-synchronization is or how it can be 
achieved.  Alberts, Gartska, and Stein help narrow the 
definition by explaining that “Self-Synchronization is a 
mode of interaction between two or more entities,”19 and 
requires  
                     
17
 Ibid., 158. 
18
 Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, “Network Centric Warfare: 
Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, 
January 1998 
19
 David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, Network 
Centric Warfare. (Washington: Department of Defense, 1999), 175-176. 
15 
two or more robustly networked entities, shared 
awareness, a rule set, and a value adding 
interaction.  This combination… enables entities 
to operate in the absence of traditional 
hierarchical mechanisms for command and control.20 
Alberts and Hayes state that the assumptions for 
self-synchronization are: 
• Clear and consistent understanding of 
command intent; 
• High quality information and shared 
situational awareness; 
• Competence at all levels of the force; and 
• Trust in the information, subordinates, 
superiors, peers, and equipment.21 
They assert that with the appropriate information 
and training, disparate units can self-synchronize and 
conduct complex warfare activities from the bottom up. 
4. Problems 
a. Command and Control 
Distinctions between command and control are hard 
to define and are often self-referential.  Some would claim 
that command is what commanders do and control is what non-
commanders do.  Others may say that commanders are people 
who command.  This problem with distinctions helps lead to 
what Alberts and Hayes call “inappropriate defenses of 
tradition, hero worship, and a misunderstanding of the 
enduring nature of command and control”22  Pigeau and McCann 
offer the following distinction: 




 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge. 
(Washington: Department of Defense, 2003), 27. 
22
 Ibid., 14. 
16 
• Control: those structures and processes 
devised by command to enable it and manage 
risk. 
• Command: the creative expression of human 
will necessary to accomplish the mission.23 
What is lacking from the above discussion of 
command and control is a sense of responsibility.  Command 
functions, such as planning, organizing, and controlling 
forces, may be distributed, but command as a responsibility 
should not be.  Command is more than an idea of how to 
employ troops on the battlefield, it extends off of the 
battlefield to peace times and includes a responsibility 
for all that those under one’s command do and fail to do.  
Command also entails a legal responsibility for personnel, 
equipment, and decisions.  Control of troops includes 
employment during battle and the processes to enable 
command decisions, but it does not include the 
responsibility associated with command.  Although the above 
is a hardly a formal definition, it highlights that part of 
the equation has been removed from many discussions of 
Network Centric Warfare. 
b. Self-Synchronization 
If one accepts that given the required elements 
for self-synchronization units can self-synchronize, what 
does it really mean?  How do self-synchronizing units 
determine what actions need to be taken and what forces 
will conduct them?  The delineation of objectives and 
allocation of forces is traditionally a command function.  
Who conducts this function in a self-synchronizing force?  
Alberts and Hayes explain that 
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The command function is not absent in self-
synchronized forces; however, it does depend on 
achieving congruent command intent, shared 
situational awareness, authoritative resource 
allocation, and appropriate rules of engagement, 
as well as similar measures that guide but do not 
dictate details to subordinates.24 
This statement implies that the command function 
(what commanders do) in addition to decision making 
authority is distributed amongst the self-synchronizing 
units, and that separate units can come together to resolve 
real-time disputes.  It also assumes that initial guidance 
is given by a higher echelon and carried through by the 
self-synchronizing forces with no additional interaction 
between echelons.  With a distributed command function as 
defined above, it is neither clear where the congruent 
command intent comes from, nor who is responsible for 
determining if objectives have been met or need to be 
changed. 
The above vision of self-synchronization does not 
clearly explain how forces will self-synchronize.  One 
problem is that the traditional command functions are 
divorced from actual commanders with the assumption that 
all units will be led by competent leaders and will not 
require a higher commander for action.  This assumption is 
partially grounded in the belief that equally trained 
units, when faced with the same information about command 
intent, friendly disposition, and enemy disposition, will 
collaborate to agree on a common course of action.  There 
continues to be much debate about the ability to share 
information in real time so that separate units will have 
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the same information, and this will be addressed later.  
Assuming that the technical problem of sharing information 
is solvable, even with the same information, leaders will 
not always come to common conclusions about their situation 
(shared situational awareness) nor be able to reach 
agreement on a common course of action.  In fact, 
disagreement about the correct action is the norm in 
military operations not the exception.  Self-
synchronization assumes away the responsibility for 
arbitrating disagreements between self-synchronizing units 
by distributing the command function among many coequal 
entities.   
Alberts, Hayes and others have noted that with no 
single commander responsible for performing command 
functions (allocation and reallocation of resources, 
choosing courses of action, determining priority of 
objectives, etc.) distributed forces may lose their ability 
to act as a coherent force and tip into chaos.  The 
arguments against forces tipping into chaos generally 
involve training and shared information with the belief 
that well trained units with the same information will 
always agree to take the best action.25  This argument is 
insufficient in that the real defense against tipping into 
chaos is command oversight by tactical commanders who 
purposefully maintain integrity of forces.  Even with 
identical training and information, two units engaged in 
direct tactical action may not respond to real time changes 
on the battlefield in like manner and often will have 
conflicting short term priorities.  Even if engaged units 
are able to respond to changes in the situation, their 
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actions will be largely controlled by their level of 
engagement and their local perspective.  It can be argued 
that it is human nature to deal with the most pressing 
problems first, especially when one’s life is at risk.  
Even if information about a new or different threat is made 
available, a leader engaged in combat may not give away 
supporting assets, redistribute forces, or sacrifice his 
troops to meet this new threat.  A higher level tactical 
commander must be responsible for making those decisions to 
ensure that the force can continue to fight. 
B. FORCENET 
1. Definitions 
The US Navy has stated that it will operationalize 
Network Centric Warfare through FORCEnet.  The official 
definition of FORCEnet, as adopted by the Commander, Naval 
Network Warfare Command, is: 
FORCEnet is the operational construct and 
architectural framework for naval warfare in the 
information age that integrates warriors, 
sensors, networks, command and control, 
platforms, and weapons into a networked, 
distributed combat force that is scalable across 
all levels of conflict from seabed to space and 
sea to land.26 
This definition is all-encompassing and is intended to 
imply that FORCEnet is not just a communications network; 
it is the entire, fully networked naval force.  However, 
the above definition has not been fully accepted within the 
Navy, Marine Corps, Systems Commands, or DoD contractors.  
The Naval Transformation Roadmap states 
FORCEnet is the operational construct and 
architectural framework that will provide the 
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capability to deliver persistent and 
comprehensive surveillance, rapid networked 
command, and common, accurate battlespace picture 
necessary to support decision making at a tempo 
that overwhelms an adversary’s capability to 
react and respond.27 
This definition narrows the scope of FORCEnet to an 
information architecture and not a total force concept, but 
it is still an ambitious, overarching view of what FORCEnet 
should be.  The implied assumption in the Naval 
Transformation Roadmap definition is that by building the 
technological architecture for moving and delivering 
information, creating a common battlespace picture, and 
supporting decision making at appropriate levels, a netted 
force capable of conduction Network Centric Warfare will 
emerge. 
The important distinction between the above 
definitions is that the Naval Transformation Roadmap 
removes the organization and employment of forces from the 
FORCEnet picture.  FORCEnet can exist separately from the 
forces that use it and from their method of employment.  
This view is consistent with the Sea Power 21 concept 
quoted in Chapter I. 
2. Vision versus Reality 
a. Sea Power 21 
FORCEnet is viewed as the glue that unites Sea 
Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing in the Sea Power 21 
vision28.  The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) has 
broken the four pillars of Sea Power 21 into Mission 
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Capabilities Packages (MCP) and further into Envisioned 
Capabilities (EC).29  Figure 1 shows how the pillars are 
broken into MCPs.  The three MCPs for FORCEnet are ISR 
(Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), COP/CTP 
(Common Operational Picture/Common Tactical Picture), and 
Communications and Data Networks. 
 
Figure 1.   Sea Power 21 MCPs30 
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These three FORCEnet MCPs are broken into 14 
Envisioned Capabilities as shown in Figure 2.  The FORCEnet 
MCPs exclusively concern data collection (ISR), data 
integration (COP/ CTP) and connectivity (Communications and 
Data Networks), which are all essential to FORCEnet.  The 
missing elements as envisioned by the Strategic Studies 
Group XXI definition are decision aids, cognitive aids, 
force organizations, and command and control structures.  
Simply connecting units and sharing data will not yield the 
“orders of magnitude improvement” that FORCEnet and NCW 
promise.  New ways of organizing and employing units are 
also necessary.  Decision and cognitive aids are vital to 
sifting through the potential soup of information that can 
be generated in a highly connected system.  The MCP and EC 
breakdown of Figure 2 serves to further define down  
 
 
Figure 2.   FORCEnet MCPs and ECs31 




FORCEnet to a war time internet.  This vision is attractive 
because it is primarily an engineering problem that can be 
funded and purchased.  The problem is that without a larger 
vision of employment, the systems built may not bring any 
additional capability to the battlefield. 
b. Command Organizations 
Depending on which definition is used, self-
synchronization attempts to distribute either the command 
function or decision making authority among lateral units.  
This technique can be beneficial in short term tactical 
environments, but has the potential to present major 
problems at higher levels.  One important consideration is 
that FORCEnet must preserve the legal concept of command.  
Commanders are legally responsible for all that their 
subordinates do and fail to do.  Commanders cannot delegate 
their responsibility, but traditionally have delegated 
authority to subordinate leaders.  Some advocates of self-
synchronization see a military that does not have 
commanders responsible for their subordinates in the same 
manner.  When Alberts and Hayes discuss distributing the 
command function, they are also distributing the 
responsibility of commanders.32  This is a radical departure 
from traditional military command organizations and may be 
unachievable for a large force.  The Navy and Marine Corps 
must be careful not to radically limit the responsibility 
of commanders when attempting to build a Network Centric 
Warfare capable force. 
3. Common Pictures 
One key attribute that FORCEnet must possess is the 
ability to provide a common battlespace picture.  For a 
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common picture to be valuable it must be able to display 
desired information accurately, in real-time, and clearly 
enough that commanders can quickly use the information.  
There are several recognized problems with developing 
common pictures.  The latency problem involves the ability 
to keep common pictures updated in real-time.  Because any 
information must be sent from the reporting source, to the 
common picture, and then to the user, there is a delay in 
transfer of information.  When satellites are used to relay 
information, this delay can be substantial.  It is possible 
for two users to have different pictures based solely on 
their distance from the common picture transmitter.  
Another problem is that the same information is often 
reported by multiple sources.  This double reporting can 
result in a single piece of data (for example, an enemy 
unit) being duplicated multiple times over.  A similar 
problem is that two reporting sources may report slightly 
different information with no system for immediately 
determining which is correct.  For example, source A 
reports a reinforced platoon-sized force at grid 123456 and 
source B reports a company minus sized force at grid 
123460.  Each report may refer to a separate group of enemy 
troops, or they may both be reporting on the same force at 
different locations.  The ground truth cannot be 
immediately determined until some form of verification is 
done. 
Another, more fundamental, problem with common 
pictures is that there is little agreement on what they 
should contain.  Some common pictures are a storehouse for 
all information; others give targeted pictures of only 
certain pieces of information.  Several varieties of common 
25 
pictures have been proposed. The two most common types are 
detailed below, and Figure 3 highlights some important 
differences. 
a. Common Operational Picture 
The Common Operational Picture, or COP, is the 
most commonly discussed common picture and is often used to 
mean a generic common picture.  Not all versions of the COP 
are the same, but the Defense Information System Agency 
views the COP as a single repository of all available 
information for the operational level commander.  The COP 
is configured in its development and is largely not 
changeable by the user.  This model has fallen out of favor 
recently because of its “one size fits all” design, command 
push architecture, and inefficient use of bandwidth.33  The 
cornerstone of the COP is that it is truly common for all 
users, but it lacks flexibility in use and display that 
users need. 
b. User Defined Operational Picture 
The User Defined Operational Picture, or UDOP, is 
a more flexible version of the COP.  Many data integration 
and data display engineers have abandoned the COP for the 
UDOP.  UDOPs are configurable and reconfigurable by the 
users to present only the information that a user asks for.  
They are built on a “on demand” architecture that looks for 
the information that a user requests.  They can contain any 
information available to the system, but the user only 
receives the information that he requests.  One failing of 
the UDOP model is that it presents the user only what the 
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user asks for, and there is no way for the user to get 
information that he does not know he needs.34 
 
Figure 3.   COP and UDOP35 
 
C. STATE OF TECHNOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES  
1. Technological Areas 
The emerging technologies presented here have been 
broken down into five areas.  These areas represent what a 
person does with information.  First, the information must 
be gathered.  This can be done through the five senses, 
through external sensors, from Intelligence Analysts, or 
from a computer system.  Once the information is gathered, 
it must be processed.  This can be done internally, by an 
analyst, or by an automated system.  After the information 
is processed, or sometimes before, depending on time 






constraints, the user must decide or act upon the 
information.  This decision may be to take a specific 
action, take no action, gather more information, do more 
processing, or ignore the information entirely.  At some 
point the user will need to move the information.  This may 
simply be from the gathering asset (sensor) to the 
processing asset (analyst), or it may be moving it to 
another command or unit.  While he does all of this, the 
user must protect the information.  Protection is more than 
just standard Information Assurance and Security, but also 
includes ensuring the timeliness of the information and its 
pedigree.  Technological concerns will be broken into the 
above areas of gather, process, move, decide, and protect. 
2. Gather 
This thesis does not focus on gathering or sensing 
assets or technologies.  The state of the art in this area 
is rapidly evolving and is beyond the scope of this work.  
It is assumed that sensors exist that can place useful 
information into the FORCEnet architecture.  This thesis 
addresses the information once it has left the sensor. 
3. Process 
a. Computing Power 
 Computer processing power has obeyed Moore’s Law 
since the invention of the silicon microprocessor.  Moore’s 
Law states that the number of transistors that a 
microprocessor manufacturer can place on a chip doubles 
about every two years.  As a result, computer processing 
speed will go up while cost will go down.36  Moore 
recognized that this trend would slow down and eventually 
level off as transistors became so small that quantum 
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effects and the size of atoms would interfere with the 
operation of transistors.  However, modern parallel 
computing schemes are encountering a different problem.  
Because these computers can use dozens, and soon hundreds, 
of single processors and have reached the teraflop range in 
clock speed, they can perform calculations faster than they 
can access memory.  Memory access is limited by the speed 
of light and the physical distance between the memory 
storage location and the chip conducting calculations.  
Work is being done by some IT companies to shorten physical 
distances in computer processors, but the speed of light 
problem will eventually limit the growth of conventional 
computing power37. 
b. Smart Materials 
Non-silicon computing has seen some recent 
interest thanks to new photo-reactive and electro-reactive 
materials.  These “smart” materials are used in place of 
traditional computing components to create wearable 
computers and power sources.  Electric “muscles” are made 
of materials that expand when a current is applied, and 
when physically contracted will produce a current.  In 
laboratory experiments, these materials have been shown to 
be reliable enough to be used as a low current power 
source.  Also, these “smart” materials can be woven into 
fabric to create basic analog and digital computers that 
can do basic calculations, store data, and even play music.  
Although far from a mature technology, “smart” uniforms may 
be used in the future for forward units38. 
 
                     
37
 Presentation, HP Labs, March, 2004. 
38




Metadata is information about data and is an 
important element in building the FORCEnet network.  Much 
the work in fusing and integrating FORCEnet data assumes 
that pieces of data can be tagged so that the system knows 
how to process them.  There are several languages in use 
now with this capability, such as the Extensible Markup 
Language (XML).  Each language has its own capabilities and 
limitations, but one consistent problem is that by tagging 
data the amount of bits needed to represent the data grows 
proportionately.  As a result, the use of metadata greatly 
increases the bandwidth requirement for any given piece of 
data.  For example, a forward unit wishes to send an enemy 
grid coordinate back to a higher command echelon.  The 
eight digit alpha numeric grid coordinate (i.e. AB123456) 
nominally takes up a defined number of bits depending on 
the encoding scheme used.  However, the data needs to be 
tagged with additional information to be useful to the 
system.  Some metadata tags include time sent or sending 
unit.  As the data move up through the network as explained 
in the Chapter IV, additional tags may be added at each 
level.  These additional tags will each increase the size 
of the data packet. 
The problem of increased data size is greatly 
overshadowed by the utility of metadata tags.  Competing or 
conflicting pieces of information can have tags which 
identify: 
• Time created, 
• Time transmitted, 
• Source, 
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• Whether or not it has been verified, 
• How it was verified and by whom, 
• Which units have used the data. 
Other pieces of important metadata can be built 
into the tagging architecture as necessary.  This 
capability allows information to have a verifiable pedigree 
so that decision makers know which pieces of information 
may be most relevant or reliable in a given situation.39 
4. Move 
a. Communications on the Move 
A large amount of work has been done in the DoD 
to improve bandwidth for digital communications to tactical 
units.  Ships and aircraft have several promising programs 
to greatly increase over the horizon communications 
bandwidth (fiber-based terrestrial bandwidth is not a 
limiting factor) but little progress has been made to solve 
the “comms on the move” problem for infantry and land 
vehicles.  Programs like the Joint Tactical Radio System 
(JTRS) have made large promises that have so far been 
unrealized, and mobile satellite receivers suffer from the 
“pointing problem,” keeping a moving vehicle in the 
satellite footprint and pointing in the right direction. 
These problems come from the fact that over-the-
horizon communications in the field can presently only be 
accomplished through satellites.  In order to achieve a 
high bandwidth signal, higher frequency signals are needed.  
These are line of sight and cannot be used for over-the-
horizon communications without some means to relay them.  
Traditional over-the-horizon communications, such as HF 
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have insufficient bandwidth for digital communications.  
Some work has been done in building Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) relays in the form of BAMs and HAUAVs.  Other 
proposed solutions include “TacSats” (very low orbit 
satellites that can be launched by field commanders as 
needed)40, and field-expedient cell towers.  These concepts 
are currently very immature, but show promise for the near 
future.  Any of these relay platform at lower than orbital 
altitudes offer some significant advantages and 
disadvantages compared to satellite communications.  
Constellations or groups of UAVs or TacSats can be quickly 
put up in desired locations, moved as the battle moves, and 
reconstituted if electronically attacked.  They require 
less transmit power both at the surface and on board and 
they are local assets that do not have to compete with 
national requirements although deconfliction of airspace 
and frequency bands would still be required.41 
b. Bandwidth Aggregation 
Another approach to the bandwidth problem 
involves better management of the bandwidth that is already 
available.  Prototypes have been built that can manage 
three or more sources of bandwidth to transmit information 
though the best available source.  If a high bandwidth 
connection is lost, the program automatically adjusts to 
use the next best available option.  These systems do not 
simply use one source at a time, but can aggregate 
bandwidth and utilize it all as one big “pipe.”  These 
concepts, when coupled with Content Shaping (below) allow a 
commander to use available bandwidth for routine purpose 
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(such as emails home or internet browsing) while ensuring 
that critical communications (such as orders and 
intelligence reports) are transmitted 42 
c. Always Best Connected 
Always best connected algorithms are becoming 
common in the wireless community.  They allow a system to 
check for various ways to connect to a desired node and 
choose the best one available.  As conditions change, the 
system continually updates to the best connection 
available.  As these algorithms get better, they will allow 
systems forming ad hoc networks to constantly stay 
connected and quickly switch between pathways without user 
input.43 
d. Routing Scheduling 
In addition to always best connected algorithms, 
routing scheduling can help maintain connections at the 
highest bandwidths available.  Routing scheduling will 
dynamically switch between Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA) and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) depending 
on which coding technique provides the best service to the 
user.  As electronic traffic changes, along with 
environmental conditions and data types, the coding scheme 
for any given signal can adjust so that the best connection 
with highest possible throughput is maintained.44 
e. Content Shaping 
Content Shaping is an effort involving the 
ability to automatically adjust the information that is 
sent between users to the size of the bandwidth available.  
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Transmitting locations, such as websites or data nodes, can 
determine the bandwidth available and adjust the data sent 
accordingly.  This is more than changing transmitting 
speeds, but includes changing the content that is sent.  An 
example is compressing streaming video to lower quality 
when a high speed connection is lost.  A low bandwidth 
submarine can hit the same site as a high bandwidth fiber 
user and get the same critical information, but in a 
different format.  This concept can also be coupled to an 
“always best connected” algorithm to not only ensure 
connectivity but also that important information is 
transferred.  By shaping the content transmitted, a user 
can also prioritize traffic so that during high traffic, 
low bandwidth environments, only high priority traffic is 
sent and the rest ends up being dropped or buffered.45 
5. Decide/Act 
The field of decision aids is a very crowded and 
varied discipline.  Most “decision aids” are actually 
better information aggregation systems.  They do not “aid” 
the decision maker in the sense that they analyze outcomes 
or present alternatives, but instead present information to 
the decision maker in a better format.  These types of 
decision aids could be more accurately described as 
situational awareness aids in that they help users get a 
clearer situational picture faster and are quickly becoming 
more and more user friendly.  Some companies have used 
directional sound, 3-D immersion, and bio-mechanical 
techniques to improve the information transfer process.  
Other types of decision aids are designed to actually help 
the decision maker come to a better decision.  A few are 
discussed below. 




a. Simulations and Information Pedigrees 
Several companies have started to attempt to use 
computer simulation to help decision makers reach a desired 
outcome.  These simulations are currently not usable on a 
tactical scale, but have begun to show promise especially 
in network modeling.  At strategic and operational levels, 
these models can help planners test a variety of plans and 
see projected outcomes.  These simulations will become very 
important as the pace of battle increases.  Early 
simulations are being used in air and missile defense 
commands and may soon be making tactical decisions about 
which targets are friendly and hostile.   
As computer-aided decision aids get more 
advanced, it becomes important to be able to identify the 
pedigree of pieces of information and recommended courses 
of action.  Algorithms can identify which pieces of 
information were used to reach a given conclusion, and 
identify how the conclusion would change if certain 
elements of information change or are proven false.  By 
identifying critical elements of information, decision 
makers can recognize how a recommendation was reached and 
determine if a suggested course of action is still valid.  
This concept can help prevent cascading assumptions that 
lead to decisions based on guesswork and no real data 
b. Always Best Located 
The DoD and the world at large widely recognize 
that U.S. reliance on Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 
information is a potential vulnerability.  As GPS signals 
become easier and easier to deny in specific geographic 
locations, new techniques for targeting and navigation are 
needed.  One attempt is the Always Best Located algorithm.  
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In addition to being able to tie in multiple navigation 
systems (GPS, INS, etc) this algorithm can do GPS over IP 
to a surprising degree of accuracy.  By using a GPS 
receiver in the San Francisco Bay area, researchers at 
University of California San Diego can transmit data over 
an IP network and get 50 meter accuracy.  This degree of 
accuracy is insufficient for some targeting algorithms, but 
is definitely good for navigation.  In the near future an 
asset out of the theater may be able to receive GPS data 
and transmit data to an asset in a GPS denied area that is 
sufficient for targeting.46 
6. Protect 
The field of information and network security is far 
too vast to be addressed in this thesis.  Many different 
techniques are available for security that range from 
object level security to low probability of intercept 
communications.  The triad of computer security consists of 
availability (sometimes called access), confidentiality 
(sometimes called secrecy), and non-reputability.  Each of 
these elements has its own problems and solutions with some 
interesting work being done.  In addition to computer 
security, there is also a security concern with military 
information.  True multi-level security systems have been 
designed, but none have been successfully deployed for a 
variety of reasons.  Below are a few important points 
concerning a huge field of work. 
a. Dissimilar Redundancy and Reconstitution 
A growing concern within the DoD is the US 
military’s inability to fight in a “lost comm” condition.  
As smart systems become more and more reliant on networks 
and communication, their vulnerability to attack grows as 




well.  This problem grows exponentially as the services 
acquire more and more joint systems that use the same 
techniques for passing information.  For example, if all 
systems rely on C band satellite communications, what 
happens when the C band is denied?  Likewise, as digital 
communications moves toward IP, how does information get 
passed when the IP network is shut done?  To improve the 
probability that a highly networked system will stay 
connected, a series of dissimilarly redundant 
communications capabilities can be imbedded.  Dissimilar 
redundant communications allow at least a minimal level of 
connectivity in a non-permissive environment and should be 
considered during the design of new systems.  In addition 
to dissimilar redundancy, reconfigurability can help to 
maintain a networked system.  Both communication hardware 
and software need to be able to be restored after an 
attack.  If satellites are destroyed, there needs to be a 
way to restore over-the-horizon communications to ensure 
access to the networks is not lost.   
b. Encryption 
Modern encryption algorithms remain ahead of 
modern cracking algorithms.  However, this advantage will 
not last for long47 as cheap computing power continues to 
become available.  Asymmetric encrypting schemes are of 
immediate concern because of the lack of mathematical rigor 
related to them.  Mathematicians have been unable to 
quantify how difficult a problem the RSA encrypting scheme, 
and all similar schemes, is to solve.  The problem is that 
RSA is based on large number factoring which has never been 
proven to be a difficult or unsolvable problem.  If a 
                     
47
 Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare Security. (New York: ACM 
Press, 1999), 294-295. 
37 
bright young mathematician were to develop a very fast 
algorithm for large number factoring, RSA would be rendered 
useless overnight.  A potential successor is the Elliptical 
Curve encryption algorithm.  It is transparent to the user 
which algorithm is involved, but the Elliptical Curve has 
the advantage of mathematical rigor behind it.  This scheme 
can be proven to have an appropriate level of difficulty 
and can be easily adjusted as computing power increases.48 
c. Multi-Level Security 
In many circles of the DoD, multi-level security 
is discussed in the same tone as unicorns and elves.  A 
true multi-level security system may never be developed, 
but there are some ways around the problem during a 
military campaign.  A proposed solution is derived from the 
classification process of operational information.  
Operational information is classified for one or both of 
the following reasons: the information itself is 
classified, or the source that collected it is classified.  
Often, the important pieces of information, enemy location 
and disposition, enemy activity, etc., is unclassified but 
cannot be passed to the field commanders because of the 
source or other ancillary information.  A potential 
workaround is to have a classified clearing house that 
identifies which pieces of information are classified and 
tag them to their appropriate level.  Data can then be sent 
through channels with classified portions stripped off the 
message where appropriate.  This technique would allow a 
corporal to receive the information that an enemy tank 
column is heading for his position without knowing that it 
came from a CIA operative.  This idea can be extended so 
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that information sharing with coalition partners and non-
government agencies can be controlled in a similar manner.  
The difficult part of implementing this concept is 
identifying the rules for tagging pieces of information.  
If the “business rules” can be developed, the technological 
application would be relatively simple.   
Another potential workaround is that operational 
intelligence often has a lifetime attached to it.  The 
position of friendly assets from three weeks ago may no 
longer be useful to anyone after they have moved.  
Classification standards do not account for the time-
sensitive nature of this type of intelligence, and 
information sharing could be greatly improved if lifetimes 
were attached to classification levels.  An example would 
be that the location and disposition of an enemy logistics 
point is reported by a Special Operations unit in the 
vicinity.  The unit then departs, but their report remains 
classified.  Once the unit is gone, there may no longer be 
useful information for the enemy in the report, but 
friendly commanders may not be able to access the 
information because of a past classification of the 
information.  A lifetime attached to the classification 
would help this problem.  Again, the difficulty lies in 
establishing the “business rules” for implementing this 
type of system and determining when a report no longer 
requires classification. 
D. PROBLEMS 
1. Shortfalls in Vision 
Both Network Centric Warfare and its instantiation in 
FORCEnet are ambitious visions.  They also both have some 
significant shortfalls.  Some advocates of NCW attempt to 
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divorce NCW from tactical command and control by employing 
self-synchronization as a replacement for traditional 
command functions and attempt to eliminate, or at least 
marginalize, the importance of unity of command.  These two 
concepts have the potential to promote chaos on the 
battlefield and remove the ability of a military unit to 
produce coherent effects. 
The FORCEnet vision suffers from a lack of agreement 
on its definition throughout the Department of the Navy.  
This disparity has led to the “Big FORCEnet, Little 
FORCEnet” paradigm in OPNAV and elsewhere.  Big FORCEnet 
has come to mean the full spectrum vision put forward by 
the SSG, while Little FORCEnet is the physical network that 
connects units.  Little FORCEnet is addressed by the MCPs 
in Figures 1 and 2 above and can be procured as information 
systems.  Big FORCEnet is much harder for the Navy to get 
its hands around and is nearly impossible to develop 
through the normal procurement process.  Without a unifying 
vision for Big FORCEnet, Little FORCEnet is being built in 
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III. PROPOSED TOPOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
1. FORCEnet 
As referenced above, FORCEnet has multiple definitions 
that range from just a military internet to the all 
encompassing vision of SSG XXI.  Here, the FORCEnet 
information topology refers to the design of the computer 
network and its associated communications requirements; 
however, this does not imply that FORCEnet is only the 
computer and communications networks.  At some level, 
FORCEnet needs to have a communication network in place to 
move information between users, but FORCEnet itself can and 
should be much larger.  The design of the network needs to 
match the intended use of these communications and 
computing assets.  The communications network, or Little 
FORCEnet, cannot be built without regard to its use. 
By addressing the larger or higher level issues of the 
FORCEnet network’s employment, a better information 
movement system can be designed.  Technical concerns 
obviously need to be addressed, but FORCEnet is not just a 
technical undertaking.  The organizational structure of 
units employing FORCEnet, as well as the type of operations 
in which FORCEnet will be employed, needs to be addressed 
in order to ensure that the final product can meet the 
requirements of the operating forces. 
2. Common Pictures 
Common pictures are often confused with common views.  
This may be a semantic argument, but it is presented here 
for clarity when discussing common pictures below.  The 
impetus behind the design for the CROP and UDOP was that 
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the one-size-fits-all COP was unwieldy for commanders49.  
Too much information or extraneous information cluttered 
the COP, and commanders at multiple echelons were not able 
to effectively sift through the information.  A popular 
solution to the information overload problem has been to 
combine a “publish and subscribe (pub-sub)” system with the 
COP.  Units that produce information will publish products 
to a common database and consumers will subscribe to the 
information that they need.  The pub-sub construct is 
employed in most CROP and UDOP models.  This solution works 
well to limit the amount of information presented to a user 
to a manageable amount. 
The problem with the pub-sub construct as employed by 
most UDOP and CROP models is that there is no single, 
complete, integrated picture.  Each user chooses which 
pieces of information to view, but nowhere is complete 
integration done.  FORCEnet needs to have a single complete 
picture within the system to maximize the benefit of 
drawing information from multiple sources.  Users may 
select how they view the common picture by selecting which 
aspects they need to see, but the picture exists in and of 
itself.  Here, when speaking of a common picture, it is 
implied that the picture is a complete, integrated picture 
of the operating environment.  Under this construct, a UDOP 
would be a User Defined Operational View (UDOV) that 
selects which pieces of the common picture need to be 
displayed (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.   UDOP vs. UDOV 
 
B. FOUR-TIER MODEL 
The FORCEnet network, as proposed here, is a network 
of networks.  Each command from the lowest practical level 
has its own network for sharing information.  These 
networks are connected with each other along organizational 
and functional lines.  Additionally, ad hoc connections are 
available to be established and broken as needed to conduct 
missions.  This model is designed to be an operational and 
tactical network, but it can easily be extended in scope to 
cover administrative concerns as well.   
The basic topology of the proposed FORCEnet network is 
a four-tier structure.  Each tier of networks performs 
similar functions at different levels of granularity.  This 
design allows commanders to maintain control of their units 
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while not interfering with self-synchronization of forward 
units.  Information exchanges between levels are governed 
by business rules agreed upon by appropriate commanders.  
Information is exchanged through either standard or on-
request exchanges which are explained in greater detail in 
Chapter IV.  The four-tier model is designed to separate 
types of information to aid users in finding important 
pieces of information.  A tactical unit needs information 
relevant to the current tactical picture and is not 
immediately concerned with civil unrest elsewhere in the 
world.  A strategic commander may be interested in that 
civil unrest because it will affect the apportionment of 
his assets.  These distinctions between types of valuable 
information are captured in the four-tier model so that the 
right information is delivered to the right people at the 
right time. 
1. Common Strategic Network (CSN) 
The Common Strategic Network is owned by the Commander 
in Chief and is operated at the Department of Defense 
level.  This CSN ties together strategic information from 
all national level assets and supports the Regional 
Combatant Commanders.  The CSN is intended to support all 
elements of national power by interfacing with all relevant 
government agencies (CIA, FBI, State Department, etc.).  
Business rules for sharing information across agencies are 
arbitrated and agreed upon by the appropriate 
representatives, and these rules are designed into the 
system.  The CSN is a military network, so appropriate 
legal issues regarding sharing information have to be 
accounted for when the business rules are established.  The  
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purpose of the CSN is to provide strategic level commanders 
the support they need to give strategic level guidance to 
lower echelon commanders. 
The CSN is directly linked to all active Common 
Operational Networks (CON, see below), and information is 
shared as necessary (exact information sharing requirements 
will be discussed in Chapter IV).  A key feature of the CSN 
is the Common Strategic Picture (CSP).  The CSP contains a 
real time, or near real time, strategic view of the world.  
The CSP integrates all national level strategic information 
which includes detailed information on civil and political 
environments.  Friendly military information is updated 
from the CONs and from national level intelligence assets. 
In addition to containing all relevant strategic 
information, the CSN is intended to limit, but not 
eliminate, direct access to lower level information.  By 
design, there is no tactical information resident in the 
CSP; however, specific tactical information can be accessed 
by request if needed.  Operational information is 
necessarily tied into the network to keep the CSP accurate 
and continually updated.  Although it is desirable to keep 
politicians and generals out of fighting holes, there may 
be instances when direct access to tactical information has 
immediate strategic value.  As a result, designing out the 
commander’s ability to access available information within 
FORCEnet is not a desirable choice.  Appropriate policies 
and business rules must be established, and followed, to 
ensure that commanders remain focused on their appropriate 
levels of war. 
2. Common Operational Network (CON) 
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Similar to the CSN, the CON contains all operational 
level information for a given theater of operations.  An 
important distinction between the two is that there may be 
multiple CONs active at any time.  Each campaign will have 
its own CON configured by its operational level commander.  
Different CONs can share information laterally and do not 
need to work through the CSN.  Operational Commanders have 
the discretion to determine what pieces of information 
reside on the network, and who may access each type of 
information.  The Common Operational Picture, the COP, also 
resides on the CON.  The COP contains all-source 
information, updated in real-time or near real-time, that 
is relevant to the operational level of war.  This 
information may include force location and disposition, 
geography, supply routes, or significant cultural 
information depending on the mission and target country.  
Users may choose which pieces of the COP to be displayed at 
their local terminals, but the COP exists as a distinct 
object on the CON. 
In addition to serving as the operational level 
storehouse of information, the CON also serves as the 
default common connection for lower echelon tactical units 
to share information and communicate.  Direct communication 
between lateral and disparate units is not forbidden by 
this construct, but coordination through the CON is the 
standard. 
3. Common Tactical Network (CTN) 
The CTN is similar to the CON except that it is owned 
by the senior tactical commander for conducting an 
operation and contains relevant tactical information.  
Because levels of warfare often blur and the operational 
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and tactical commander can be the same, the operational 
commander can delegate the authority to establish and 
maintain a CTN or multiple CTNs to lower component 
commanders as necessary.  An example of this is given in 
Chapter V.  Also, as campaigns progress, the senior 
tactical commander may change as new or different units 
move into the theater which requires that ownership of the 
CTN will also change.  The Common Tactical Picture (CTP) is 
contained on the CTN and contains all relevant tactical 
information.  Specific differences between the CTP and COP 
are discussed in Chapter IV.  For smaller combat operations 
and non-combat (Humanitarian Assistance, Peace Keeping, 
etc.) only one tactical commander may be in theater 
requiring a single CTN.  More commonly, multiple CTNs will 
be established as assigned by the Operational Commander to 
divide responsibility and manage a large operation.  CTNs 
have the ability to establish direct connections, share 
information, and collaborate as necessary to achieve 
operational goals. 
Like the CON, the CTN contains all tactical 
information available and users have the ability to control 
what types of information are resident on their terminals.  
The CTN is fed by all Local Tactical Networks assigned to 
the tactical commander, as explained below, and is the 
lowest level of network responsible for integrating and 
aggregating information.  In addition to serving as an 
information repository, the CTN also is the default 
communications hub for tactical units. 
4. Local Tactical Network (LTN) 
Each tactical echelon, to the lowest level practical, 
will have its own LTN.  It is technologically feasible 
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today to have LTNs all the way down to the platoon or 
equivalent level.  In the near future, it may be possible 
to have LTNs extending down to the fire team level.  These 
networks serve two important functions.  First they handle 
all information sharing and communications requirements 
within the appropriate unit.  Secondly, LTNs are 
responsible for communications between LTNs and with the 
CTN as needed.  LTNs do not normally feed the CON or CSN 
directly, but can when required. 
Each unit owns its own LTN which is configured to meet 
the requirements for its level of command.  For example, a 
platoon will maintain a separate network from the company 
LTN.  Both the Company Commander and Platoon Commander can 
set policies regarding the platoon LTN, especially 
information sharing requirements.  Likewise, the company 
LTN is separate from the battalion LTN, and this layering 
of LTNs continues until the next echelon owns the CTN for 
its area of responsibility.  This network-of-networks 
construct not only allows for local control of information 
flow and information display, but it allows for LTNs to 
make direct links across command boundaries.  Units from 
separate commands can connect laterally to share 
information in order to accomplish assigned missions 
without needing to traverse multiple layers of command 
organization.  Lateral commanders, within guidelines 
established by their parent commands, can share information 
as necessary in order to facilitate self-synchronization. 
5. Summary 
Figure 5 shows an example of the four-tier 
connectivity.  There may be multiple CONs active that are 
tied into the CSN at any given time.  Likewise, there may 
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be multiple CTNs active.  The default connections are 
standard communications pathways that follow chain of 
command lines.  They exist under almost all conditions to 
transmit essential information within the command 
structure, but can be broken when appropriate to a mission.  
For example, if a platoon were attached to a different 
company the original default connections would be severed.  
Ad hoc connections are set up whenever units need to 
collaborate across command boundaries.  These ad hoc 
connections may be temporary for simple intelligence 
reporting, or they may stay in place for the entire length 
of conflict depending on the situation and missions.  The 
units in the figure are for illustrative purposes and are 
by no means meant to limit the scope of this structure to a 
standard infantry battalion.  Supporting arms, other 
services, and other government agencies can easily be 
incorporated into the framework by adding the appropriate 
ad hoc connections. 
C. ADAPTABLE COMMAND AND CONTROL (AC2) 
For any vision of FORCEnet to be more than a military 
internet, it must be coupled with a command and control 
structure designed to take advantage of it.  Network 
Centric Warfare was envisioned to flatten command 
organizations and free up lower level commanders to pursue 
opportunities on the battlefield.  In order to accomplish 
this, a new way of defining command relationships and 
responsibilities is needed.  Adaptable Command and Control 
(AC2) is one technique to marry command organizations with 




1. Distributed Decision Making Authority 
Self-synchronization is discussed above, as well as 
some of the problems inherent in a self-synchronized force. 
The key component of self-synchronization is that forward 
 
 
Figure 5.   Four-tier Model 
 
commanders can make battlefield decisions and take actions 
without waiting for orders or approval from higher command 
echelons.50  Empowering lower level leaders to make 
decisions and take actions is not the same as distributing 
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the command function.  Commanders still retain their 
inherent responsibility, but delegate some authority to 
lower echelons as the situation dictates.  By distributing 
the decision making authority during a conflict, units are 
free to take action while still maintaining ties to the 
larger command echelons.  Higher level commanders 
orchestrate the action of their subordinate commanders by 
controlling their authority to act and through promulgating 
their commander’s intent.  The degree of authority to act 
granted a subordinate commander governs his ability to 
exploit battlefield opportunities, self-synchronize with 
other units, or take unplanned actions toward achieving 
specified goals. 
During planning, commanders have the discretion 
to dictate which units have what level of authority to act.  
This process is similar to dedicating a main effort or 
supporting effort in a plan.  The authority granted to a 
unit must clearly spell out what types of actions require 
clearance form higher authority.  The default mode of 
operation should always be to give lower units the highest 
authority possible.  Only missions that involve sensitive 
operations or high level coordination should be excluded.  
By granting subordinate leaders the authority to take 
action on the battlefield, the pace of the fight is greatly 
increased while still maintaining some control over the 
fight itself.  The authority to make decisions and take 
actions on the battlefield can, and should, change with the 
character of the conflict.  Oversight by higher level 
commanders is essential to ensure that forward units 
continue to operate as a cohesive force. 
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2. Multi-Level Control 
No single method for controlling troops can ever work 
in all combat situations.  Commanders need a way to 
selectively adjust the level of control they exert over 
their subordinates.  Actions prior to open conflict are 
generally regarded as requiring tight control.  Units are 
often in danger of escalating conflict prematurely or 
exposing friendly positions or movements by taking 
inappropriate actions.  Conversely, during movement to 
contact or assaults on an objective, forward units need 
freedom to take actions on the battlefield.  Multi-level 
control allows commanders to adjust the level of authority 
and responsibility for action across command echelons.  
Higher level commanders always have the option to step in 
and take control or push control to subordinate units as 
situations develop.  By pushing and pulling control up and 
down the chain of command, commanders can ensure that their 
units have both the freedom of action necessary, and the 
cohesion to necessary to conduct military operations. 
3. Lateral Collaboration 
As explained above, the term self-synchronization has 
many definitions with slight variations in meaning.  Here, 
a version of self-synchronization called lateral 
collaboration is used.  Lateral collaboration is a method 
for coequal commanders or commanders from different higher 
commands to work together to decide on a course of action 
to accomplish an assigned or implied mission.  Lateral 
collaboration also includes the tactical oversight by a 
higher echelon tactical commander of the decisions made by 
forward units.  Small unit leaders and low level commanders 
will have the freedom to collaborate across organizational 
boundaries to take actions, while a higher echelon oversees 
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them to ensure that actions taken are in accordance and in 
support of larger tactical objectives.  Each echelon of 
command is responsible for overseeing the action taken at 
lower levels and has the authority to override decisions 
made by lower level commanders.  This version of self-
synchronization does not distribute the function of command 
as Alberts and Hayes suggest, but provides a mechanism for 
commanders to exert their responsibility for subordinates 
through command oversight. In addition to oversight, 
commanders are responsible for arbitrating disagreements 
and conflicts that lower level commanders have. 
a. Operational Commander 
The operational commander is responsible for 
operational level issues while conducting campaigns.  He 
sets the large mission objectives, sets the priorities of 
operational targets, handles logistics concerns, works with 
coalition partners and other government agencies, and sets 
high level policy for the conduct of the campaign.  Since 
he is primarily concerned with operational issues, he 
should not be involved in tactical decisions made during 
the conflict unless decisions and actions taken have a 
direct conflict with operational objectives.  
b. Lower Level Operational Commanders 
Additional operational level commands may be 
established by the operational commander if needed.  These 
additional command echelons are used for large or disbursed 
campaigns or whenever the operational environment is 
exceedingly complex.  They have the discretion to laterally 





c. Tactical Commander 
The tactical commander is the senior commander 
responsible for fighting the tactical battle in a given 
area.  There may be multiple tactical commanders assigned 
by the operational commander for any operation.  He is 
responsible for publishing mission orders, commander’s 
intent, objective priorities, target priorities and 
precedence, levels of authority to act, and supported and 
supporting units.  In addition, he orchestrates the overall 
tactical battle by overseeing lateral collaborative efforts 
of forward units.  He arbitrates disagreements in resource 
allocation, courses of action, priorities of fire, and 
access to supporting arms.  As the battle evolves, he 
pushes changes to objectives, targets, and courses of 
action to subordinate leaders.   
d. Lower Level Tactical Commanders and Small 
Unit Leaders 
Forward tactical units are generally the units 
engaged in actual combat.  They also have the best 
immediate situational awareness and greatest need for 
freedom of action.  Most lateral collaboration is done at 
the lowest levels, allowing small unit leaders and lower 
echelon tactical commanders the freedom to choose courses 
of action best suited to their immediate situation.  During 
the collaboration process, coequal leaders will not always 
arrive at a common solution for a variety of reasons.  If 
one assumes that both leaders have the same tactical 
picture by tapping into the CTP, they will not always agree 
on the proper course of action for their shared picture.  
Shared situational awareness is essential for lateral 
collaboration, but shared situational awareness does not 
guarantee success.  Any two people will view their 
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situation from a different timeframe, perspective, scale 
and vantage point.51  Also, coequal commanders will often 
have competing needs for supporting arms, non-organic 
assets, and logistics requirements.  The higher echelon 
tactical commanders are responsible for arbitrating these 
disagreements. 
D. SUMMARY 
The four-tier model is what Barabasi called a scale 
free network in that its structure is constant regardless 
of what level of detail is viewed.  Scale free topologies 
have some unique properties such as built in robustness and 
lack characteristic nodes52.  The design is built upon a 
network of networks that can be assembled into whatever 
size is needed for any given operation.  For this model to 
work it requires a command and control system design to 
work with the communications network.  AC2 is such a 
command and control system. 
In order for AC2 to be an effective means of 
controlling combat elements, commanders need to change what 
functions they perform and responsibilities they have.  
Table 1 summarizes the different responsibilities of each 
level of command for ensuring the success of an operation. 
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IV. INFORMATION FLOW 
A. RESIDENT INFORMATION ELEMENTS 
Each tier of the four-tier model presented in Chapter 
III is intended to be fully configurable by the owner of 
the network.  However, certain elements of information or 
types of information need to reside on these networks for 
them to be universally useful.  Higher level networks will 
have larger amounts of archival information and processed 
intelligences while lower level networks will require more 
real time and unfiltered information.  The elements covered 
here are not meant to be exhaustive or exclusive, and 
subject matter experts will eventually need to determine 
which pieces of information are critical and which are 
extraneous.  It is important to remember that the owner of 
each network has the final say over what information 
resides on it and how it is shared.  This discretion may be 
detailed in appropriate command policies so that, for 
example, a company commander has some say over what is on a 
subordinate platoon network. 
1. Common Strategic Network 
The Common Strategic Network is intended to be a 
permanent network maintained at the Department of Defense 
level in the continental United States.  Because this 
network is terrestrially maintained with relatively 
unlimited access to power, data storage, and computing 
power, it can maintain a vast database, a large number of 
users, and fully integrate information across a spectrum of 
disciplines.  The CSN is specifically designed to support 
the Strategic Level of war which is officially defined as 
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The level of war at which a nation, often as a 
member of a group of nations, determines national 
or multinational (alliance or coalition) security 
objectives and guidance, and develops and uses 
national resources to accomplish these 
objectives.  Activities at this level establish 
national and multinational support of tactical 
forces, and provide the means by which tactical 
successes are exploited to achieve strategic 
objectives.53 
Because the strategic level of war deals with national 
level objectives, the information on the CSN needs to be of 
an appropriate scope to support national interest.  
Friendly and enemy force locations, dispositions, and 
logistics requirements are essential, but at the strategic 
level, it is vital that explanatory information be 
available for all force locations.  A large view of a 
multiple tactical battle pictures is useless and unwieldy 
at the strategic level.  For example, a blob of 1500 moving 
blue dots off the coast of a foreign country does not tell 
the strategic commander whether or not a key objective has 
been seized. 
In addition to military information, locations and 
dispositions of other governments agencies are also 
necessary.  The CSN is designed to handle top level 
integration and deconfliction of all national level assets, 
including CIA operatives, Ambassadors, Special Forces 
Teams, and NSA teams.  In addition to integrating 
information across government agencies, the CSN houses an 
integrated intelligence picture culled from all source 
intelligence across the country.  Raw intelligence as well 
as processed intelligence is integrated and analyzed to 
provide commanders a coherent strategic picture. 
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2. Common Operational Network 
The Common Operational Network is intended to be stood 
up and taken down as necessary wherever potential or 
existing conflicts exist.  Multiple CONs may exist in any 
given theater of operations if multiple campaigns are 
active.  An example would be that separate CONs are 
necessary to support campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The CON is designed to support the operational level of war 
which is officially defined as 
The level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained 
to accomplish strategic objectives within 
theaters or areas of operations.  Activities at 
this level link tactics and strategy by 
establishing operational objectives, sequencing 
events to achieve the operational objectives, 
initiating actions, and applying resources to 
bring about and sustain these events.  These 
activities imply a broader dimension of time or 
space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic 
and administrative support of tactical forces, 
and provide the means by which tactical successes 
are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.54 
Because the operational level of war bridges strategy and 
tactics, the information resident on it must do the same.  
Operational actions happen at a faster tempo than strategic 
actions (usually, although historic counter examples 
exist), therefore information must be collected, analyzed, 
and displayed at a faster tempo than strategic information. 
The increased tempo of operational level actions 
coupled with the transient nature of the CON implies that 
less processed intelligence will be available directly on 
the network.  Detailed analysis of enemy culture, politics, 
and geography is resident on the CSN and can be requested 




as needed.  Operational intelligence gathered, analyzed, 
and integrated from in theater assets makes up the bulk of 
enemy information resident on the network.   
Friendly information is similar to that on the CSN, 
but is more granular and restricted to the local area of 
operations.  Explanatory information is equally as 
important at the operational level as it is at the 
strategic.  Exact locations of individual small units are 
not as important as the status of operational objectives 
and logistical support needs. 
3. Common Tactical Network 
The CTN is owned by the senior tactical commander, as 
described above, in any area of responsibility.  The 
information resident on the network is intended to support 
the tactical level of war which is officially defined as: 
The level of war at which battles and engagements 
are planned and executed to accomplish military 
objectives assigned to tactical units or task 
forces.  Activities at this level focus on the 
ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat 
elements in relation to each other and to the 
enemy to achieve combat objectives.55 
At this level, real-time and positional information are 
much more important than at other levels.  The explanatory 
information is still needed, but its importance is 
superceded by the location and disposition of units 
throughout the battlespace.  Blobs of blue dots are 
preferable to mission status.  Similarly, intelligence is 
often raw and posted before it can be properly analyzed so 
that commanders have access to the most current 
information.  Standard tactical information covered in 
tactical orders is also resident here such as target lists, 




target priorities, mission objectives, fire control 
measures, etc.  This information can be used to deconflict 
planning and execution of tactical missions throughout the 
operation. 
4. Local Tactical Network 
Because LTNs exist at different command echelons and 
in vastly different environments, from naval surface 
escorts to squad foot patrols, the information on each 
network will vary greatly.  Each LTN will primarily contain 
a subset of the information contained on the CTN amplified 
with whatever local information is deemed important by the 
networks owner. 
B. INFORMATION EXCHANGES 
1. Standard Exchanges 
Information exchanges between networks can be of two 
general types: standard and on-request.  Standard exchanges 
are those called for by existing policy.  Information that 
is routinely shared by units is done through a standard 
exchange.  Often these are done automatically and follow 
chain of command lines.  For example, a position report 
(posrep) from a forward unit to its next higher command is 
a standard exchange.  This information is automatically 
sent to the next higher command echelon, for example from 
platoon to company, aggregated with existing friendly 
locations, and automatically sent to the next echelon.  
These exchanges are covered by existing doctrine and unit 
Standing Operating Procedures and include position reports, 
situation reports, SALUTE reports (enemy location and 
disposition), and any other standard reports. 
In addition to standard reporting, certain tactical 
and operational requests are considered standard exchanges.  
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Calls for fire (CFF), joint tactical air requests (JTAR), 
assault support requests (ASR), logistics support requests 
(LSR), naval surface fire support requests (NSFS), and any 
other common battlefield requests are handled as standard 
exchanges.  The information is automatically sent to the 
appropriate units identified by doctrine.  The individual 
addressees are imbedded in the request type, so that a call 
for fire, for example, is routed to the appropriate 
artillery battery, the fire direction center, the fire 
support coordination center, as well as higher command 
echelons.  This information is also immediately posted to 
the common tactical network so that the requesting unit, 
supporting unit, nature of request, and target can all 
quickly be identified and fires can be integrated and 
airspace deconflicted.   
Standard exchanges are intended to move along 
doctrinal command lines in accordance with established 
procedures.  Lateral, or coequal, units can set up standard 
exchange criteria when they are brought together to conduct 
a mission or perform tasks.  The intent of standard 
exchanges is to streamline the communications process so 
that all parties know what information they are expected to 
send and what information they can expect to receive during 
each phase of the battle.  These standard exchanges also 
help prevent extraneous communications exchanges so that an 
engaged unit is not receiving irrelevant information. 
2. On-Request Exchanges 
While standard exchanges follow doctrinal command 
lines, on-request exchanges are ad hoc in nature.  Units at 
any echelon request information by type, sending unit, 
location, or any other parameter that the appropriate 
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commander deems important.  An operational commander who 
has a particular interest in a tactical sensor can make a 
request to receive the raw data from that sensor.  
Similarly, a strike aircraft flight lead can request any 
information regarding RADAR detection in a certain area be 
immediately forwarded to his aircraft for the duration of 
his mission.  Standard exchanges are designed to streamline 
information exchanges and minimize extraneous information; 
conversely, on-request exchanges are meant to be flexible 
and fill any gaps that the standard exchanges do not.  On-
request exchanges are intended to be specific in nature and 
cover limited time scales, but they may be active for the 
duration of conflict if necessary. 
C. EXAMPLE 
Figure 6 shows a nominal command structure for a 
sample organization with both organic (owned) and non-
organic (supporting) assets.  At the top is the Tactical 
Commander (TC) who owns the Common Tactical Network (CTN) 
and all assets in this example.  For purposes of this 
example, the CTP is maintained at the TC node.  Directly 
under the Common Commander is an intelligence and 
operations asset (Intel) which analyzes, integrates, and 
otherwise processes raw data.  This asset updates processed 
information to the CTP.  Subordinate to the TC are two (or 
more) Higher Headquarters echelons (HHQ).  The exact 
organization the HHQ represents is irrelevant and could be 
anything from an infantry company to an expeditionary 
force.  This model scales easily with command levels added 
as appropriate.  Subordinate to each HHQ are several 
forward combat units (Unit).  In addition to the named 
units, there are multiple sensors (Sensor) and supporting 
arms (SA).  Like the HHQ, the exact nature of the sensors 
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and supporting arms is irrelevant.  A sensor organic to a 
forward Unit has been tasked to look at a named area of 
interest (NAI). A target (Tgt) is active on the battlefield 
undetected by any sensors or units. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Command Structure Example 
 
The sensor collects information from the NAI and 
automatically transmits it back to its tasking unit and 
directly to the Intel unit for analysis and integration.  
Because this information is a standard intelligence report, 
it is treated as a standard exchange and is automatically 
forwarded from the Unit to its HHQ who aggregates it and 
passes it back to the TC.  The TC automatically aggregates 
this information, updates the information to the CTP, and 
forwards it with associated aggregate information to the 
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Intel unit which integrates and analyzes the information, 
updates the CTP with the processed information, and pushes 
the update back to the HHQ units.  The same information is 
updated to the CTP twice.  The raw data that has been 
aggregated and unverified is posted immediately so that all 
units have access to it.  The data is tagged (see Metadata 
above) to identify that it is unprocessed.  Once the Intel 
unit has verified and integrated the information, the 
latest version is updated to the CTP and the tag adjusted 
as necessary.  The HHQ also sends the raw information to a 
SA asset that is in direct support of the HHQ.  From the 
TC, all information is forwarded to the operational 
commander to update the COP.  Figure 7 shows the standard 
exchanges up to the TC level. 
 
Figure 7.   Standard Exchanges 
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In addition to the standard exchanges shown in Figure 
7, on-request exchanges can be made as needed by units in 
the area of responsibility.  Figure 8 shows an example of 
possible on-request exchanges.  Here, lateral Units under 
the same HHQ request to receive the raw intelligence 
information directly from the sensor.  Also, lateral Units 
under a different HHQ have requested the aggregated data 
from the tasking Unit, and the lateral HHQ is receiving 
aggregated information from the tasking HHQ.  The SA asset 
in direct support of the tasking unit is also receiving raw 
information from the sensor, as is the TC.  These exchanges 
are requested for a specific period of time, and may be 
active requests throughout the conduct of operations or 
only for a specific incident.  Even if Units and HHQ do not 
request raw data from the sensor, they will get the 
information provided by the sensor once it has been 
integrated into the CTP and sent back down to these 
elements. 
Figure 9 shows an untasked sensor receiving a signal 
from a pop-up target.  The sensor immediately reports back 
to its organic unit and may report raw data to other 
elements in the area.  The sensor can have the ability to 
process the sensed data and determine what units need the 
information.  For example, a sensor which identifies an 
enemy air defense asset would immediately send the 
information to all aircraft in the area.  Likewise, a 
sensor that sees vehicles moving toward a friendly Unit’s 
position can send the information to that unit.  These 
exchanges are similar to on-request exchanges except that 
they are pushed by the data producing element to units that 
need the information.   
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Figure 8.   On-request Exchanges 
 
The network must also be able to identify when an 
element is no longer on the network and adjust its data 
flow accordingly.  For example, the sensor above is 
reporting back to its tasking Unit which suddenly drops off 
of the network.  The sensor recognizes that the Unit is 
gone and starts reporting back to the next command echelon, 
in this case the HHQ. 
D. SUMMARY 
The above example shows one way that information can 
be exchanged within the four-tier model.  Standard 
exchanges provide a set of default connections that mirror 
standard military organizations.  They allow commanders to 
have existing links with senior and subordinate units.  On- 
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Figure 9.   Pop Up Target 
 
request exchanges provide flexibility to the network so 
that units can get the information they need from non-
organic assets.  These exchanges facilitate conducting 
Network Centric Warfare by providing the robust 
communications backbone and a system for exploiting 
available information.  Adaptable Command and Control takes 
advantage of the network’s ability to connect co-equal and 
disparate units by providing a command organization capable 
of self-synchronization.  Chapter V further explores these 
ideas with a hypothetical example involving multiple 






The below scenario is designed to give a realistic 
example of how the four-tier model for the FORCEnet network 
could be employed.  The political situation outlined below 
is only important in that it sets the stage for the action.  
Likewise, strategic, operational, and tactical decisions 
are made to provide examples of how the system can be used.  
Specific details of force structure are unimportant; 
however, current Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG) compositions are used.  Lastly, 
certain technological specifics are intentionally 
overlooked such as input/output devices, software tools, 
and communication systems because their details are not 
important to the discussion.  It is assumed that 
information can be put into the system, exchanged between 
users, and displayed in a useful manner.  What is important 
to the scenario is how information moves between users and 
how the information flow affects the way the operation is 
conducted. 
B. BACKGROUD 
The coastal nation of S___ bordering the international 
shipping lanes of the Straits of M___ has been largely 
overrun by insurgents.  The legitimate government still has 
control over most of the capital and its international 
airport and shipping port, but has lost control over all 
other areas including the major city of J___ and its 
international airport.  Insurgents have threatened to close 
international commercial shipping lanes if the legitimate 
government does not capitulate soon.  Shutting down the 
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straits, even temporarily, will have an immediate negative 
impact on regional countries.  If the straits are closed 
for any significant length of time, global commerce will be 
greatly impacted and many economies will suffer.  Piracy in 
the straits has been a minor problem for decades, but now 
that the coastal ports are under insurgent control 
commercial vessels are regularly attacked and plundered.  
The US government has determined that reopening the straits 
to commercial traffic is a top strategic priority, followed 
closely by the reestablishment of the legitimate government 
within the country of S___. 
The closest forces to the conflict are a full 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and a Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG).  Also, a neighbor country has offered to send a 
company-sized contingent of Royal Marines and a squadron of 
naval patrol craft to aid in the operations.  A US Army 
brigade is put on alert and can be in theater within 96 
hours.  The Regional Combatant Commander has designated the 
ESG commander as the interim Joint Force Commander for the 
early phases of the operation.  The CSG is designated a 
supporting unit and is in direct support of the ESG for the 
early phases of the operation.  All units expect a Standing 
Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) to take over the operation 
once additional assets have been brought into theater, 
including the Army brigade. 
C. OPERATIONAL ACTIONS 
The ESG Commander divides the operation into three 
Operational Mission Areas each with a separate Tactical 
Commander who is ordered to stand up a Common Tactical 
Network.  The division of responsibility is by mission 
area.  Geographical areas occupied and supporting assets 
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required for each mission may overlap.  Each Tactical 
Commander is responsible for resolving any potential 
conflicts. 
1. Reinforce the Capital 
The ESG Commander has assigned the coalition Royal 
Marines to execute an unopposed landing to reinforce the 
legitimate government’s security in the capital.  They are 
reinforced with the MEU’s organic HUMINT Exploitation Team 
(HET), Military Police units and any necessary public 
affairs or civil affairs assets.  The Combat Service 
Support Element Commander is assigned as the Tactical 
Commander and stands up the CTN.  The coalition Royal 
Marines and the security forces of the legitimate 
government are granted access to the CTN so that they can 
share relevant tactical information.  Their access is 
restricted to types of information that the Tactical 
Commander sees as relevant, and they do not have full 
access to the entire FORCEnet network.  The level of access 
to the CTN granted to the coalition commanders can be 
adjusted as necessary by the Tactical Commander while 
access to information at the CON is controlled by the ESG 
Commander. 
2. Protect Commercial Shipping 
The CSG Commander is given the task of protecting 
commercial shipping in the straits.  He establishes a CTN 
and sets his tactical goals.  Escort plans are established, 
strikes on pirate vessels are conducted, and Theater 
Ballistic Missile Defense is set up.  Many of his strike 
assets and Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) assets will be 
tasked to support operations ashore.  The CSG Commander is 
responsible for deconflicting these requests with his own 
needs while performing escort and anti-piracy operations.  
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Because re-establishing international commerce has been set 
as a higher strategic goal than the reestablishment of the 
legitimate government, the CSG commander has priority of 
use for these assets.   
3. Restore Legitimate Government Authority 
The ESG Commander designated the MEU Commander as the 
Tactical Commander responsible for restoration of the 
legitimate government.  The MEU Commander stands up his CTN 
and prepares to defeat the insurgency ashore.  He 
establishes the following tactical goals to achieve this 
mission: 1) neutralize insurgent ADA capability, 2) execute 
an airfield seizure at the city of J___, and 3) search out 
and defeat the insurgent forces in the countryside.  
Although his organic supporting assets have been reduced by 
the other operations in the area, he is laterally tied in 
to both other CTNs and can quickly share information as 
well as request assets. 
4. Lateral Collaboration 
Three concurrent operations are drawing assets from 
the ESG and CSG.  The ESG commander has divided 
responsibilities among his subordinates, set his 
priorities, and issued mission orders.  The three tactical 
commanders assigned have the authority to laterally 
collaborate so that they can dynamically share assets.  The 
final authority to apportion, allocate, and re-allocate 
assets rests with the ESG commander, but each tactical 
commander can collaborate with his peers and agree on 
appropriate courses of action without additional approval 
from higher.  As long as the co-equal tactical commanders 
can agree on courses of action that meet operational 
requirements, no additional approval from the ESG commander 
is needed. 
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Figure 10 shows a graphical view of how forces 
relevant to the example are divided and which commander 
controls each network.  Default connections are shown 
between command echelons and follow chain of command lines.  
Ad hoc connections discussed in the example are also shown.  
It is important to note that additional ad hoc connections 
can be made when necessary and the ad hoc connections shown 
should not be viewed as the only possible connections.  The 
connection from the CON to the CSN is also not shown but 
exists. 
 
Figure 10.   Force Breakdown 
 
D. TACTICAL ACTIONS 
While escort, anti-piracy, and security missions are 
being executed by the other Tactical Commanders, the MEU 
Commander prepares his assault on the city of J___.  He 
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deploys his organic reconnaissance assets and taps into the 
COP to get information from national level intelligence 
sources.  Planning begins as the CTP is populated with 
available data.  Any HUMINT gathered in the capital 
concerning force disposition and position of ADA assets is 
routed to the MEU CTP via on-request information exchanges 
as is any relevant information gathered by other operating 
forces in the area. 
1. Neutralization of ADA 
A limited number of SA-X systems are controlled by the 
insurgents and are capable of prohibitively interfering 
with friendly air in the vicinity of J___.  A sensor has 
identified the location of one SA-X and passes the location 
to the COP.  The raw data from the sensor is automatically 
routed to the CTP via an on-request exchange.  ESG analysts 
confirm the location with other intelligence reports and 
update the original report.  The updated data is filtered 
down to the CTP via a standard exchange and is further 
disseminated by the same method.  A reconnaissance unit in 
the area receives the update and is able to move into a 
position to observe the SA-X position. 
The reconnaissance team places a call for fire which 
is routed to the Supporting Arms Coordination Center aboard 
the ESG and is filled with a cruise missile from a CSG 
shooter.  The request, along with trajectory information 
and intended target is immediately forwarded to each CTN to 
identify potential conflicts.  The flight corridor is 
identified and deconflicted with friendly air assets from 
all three mission areas.  Once the missile is launched, it 
notifies the reconnaissance team that it is in the air and 
requests a target update.  The SA-X battery has not moved, 
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so no updated location information is required.  After 
impact the reconnaissance team files a battle damage 
assessment (BDA) report which is automatically disseminated 
via standard request up the chain of command to the CTP and 
COP.  The report is integrated at the COP and the updated 
air picture is automatically forwarded to all air units. 
This evolution required four distinct pieces of 
information: the original target location, the call for 
fire, the launch of the missile, and the BDA report.  Each 
of these reports was sent from the source to one other 
person.  Once received, the network identified the type of 
information and, using appropriate rules for standard and 
on-request exchanges, disseminated the information to all 
relevant personnel.  The information was quickly shared by 
all players with almost no need to manually transmit the 
data. 
2. Airfield Seizure 
The bulk of the assault force is on the ground, and 
they are successfully pushing the insurgents off the air 
field.  The MEU Commander is monitoring the CTP which shows 
where all forces should be as well as where they have most 
recently reported in.  The enemy picture is still fuzzy as 
he and his staff wade through conflicting reports from a 
variety of sources.  Even with modern sensors and computer-
aided information analysis, the fog of war is not 
completely lifted.  However he does have a clear view of 
where his forces are and how far from the plan they have 
deviated.  So far things are going relatively smoothly and 
he continues to monitor for changes. 
Third Platoon, Alpha Company has just pushed a group 
of insurgents out of their defense and recognizes Third 
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Platoon can destroy or capture the unit if he immediately 
pursues.  The insurgent direction of retreat takes them 
across the Company boundary into First Platoon, Bravo 
Company’s zone of control.  Not wanting to lose the 
opportunity, Third Platoon Commander initiates an ad hoc 
connection with First Platoon and begins collaboration.  
First Platoon is able to readjust their position to set up 
a blocking position in support of Third Platoon’s pursuit.  
Third Platoon pushes the enemy into First Platoon’s sector 
of fire and quickly eliminates the remaining threat.   
When Third and First Platoons agreed on their course 
of action, they each sent their intentions (intended 
direction of movement, new defensive positions, etc.) up 
the chain of command via a standard exchange.  This 
information was automatically distributed to company, 
battalion, and MEU headquarters, as well as the fire 
direction center (FDC) and supporting arms coordination 
center (SACC) for supporting arms deconfliction. 
Alpha Company was initially designated the main effort 
and is engaged in moderate fighting to clear airfield 
buildings.  The Alpha Company forward air controller (FAC) 
has control of fires and has several sections of rotary 
wing close air support (RWCAS) available.  Across the 
airfield Bravo Company’s left flank has routed an enemy 
position and is giving pursuit.  The Bravo Company 
Commander pushes his Third Platoon forces forward of their 
assigned zone in pursuit of the enemy.  With his First 
Platoon involved in cutting off the retreat of one group of 
forces and his third platoon pursuing a separate group, the 
Bravo Company Commander recognizes that his forces are 
being stretched too thin to defend the access road he has 
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been assigned.  He initiates an ad hoc connection with the 
reserve company, Charlie, for some additional support in 
his sector until he can reconsolidate.  Charlie agrees to 
commit a platoon and both commanders report their 
intentions. 
The MEU CO sees the incoming changes and recognizes a 
potential disaster.  Bravo Company, attempting to exploit 
their advantage, is splitting his forces too much.  One 
platoon is chasing the enemy beyond the rest of the forces’ 
ability to support and now the Bravo Company commander is 
attempting to commit a portion of the reserve.  To compound 
matters, The MEU CO just received an unconfirmed 
intelligence report that vehicles have been spotted moving 
down the access road that Bravo is supposed to be 
supporting.  He decides to override the lateral 
collaboration between Bravo and Charlie and order Bravo to 
reconsolidate now on his assigned position.  He also 
relocated the RWCAS assets from Alpha Company to Bravo to 
deal with the upcoming conflict.  He recognizes that 
pulling assets away from Alpha may slow their advance, but 
if the vehicles overrun Bravo, they may lose the airfield.   
The MEU CO’s orders are immediately forwarded down the 
chain and all units receive the update to the plan.  Bravo 
Company pulls back Third Platoon from their pursuit and 
quickly readjusts First Platoon to their original position.  
With Bravo Company reinforced with the RWCAS, the reserve 
can be held until the MEU CO needs to commit them. 
As each smaller unit laterally collaborates to achieve 
assigned specific assigned missions, the forces can start 
to drift apart and lose coherency.  The ability of the 
four-tier model to automatically forward information to all 
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concerned players allows higher echelon tactical commanders 
to see the big picture while the lower level commanders 
focus on the details.  If the force starts to drift so far 
apart that it is in danger of losing coherency, the higher 
echelon commanders have the ability to recognize it and 
take action.  By overriding lateral collaboration at the 
platoon level, the MEU CO was able to ensure that his units 
were in position to repel the enemy counterattack.  Also, 
the MEU CO is able to dynamically reallocate assets (the 
RWCAS) so that the forces that need them right now can get 
them.  Had Bravo Company attempted to laterally collaborate 
with Alpha to get the RWCAS, his request may have been 
denied by the Alpha Company Commander who was actively 
using the RWCAS and had priority.  The MEU CO was able to 
readjust priorities, re-allocate assets, and ensure the 
coherency of his unit during the conflict. 
E. ADVANTAGES OF THE FOUR-TIER MODEL 
1. Advantages over Current Model 
Showing the definitive advantage of a networked force 
over a non-networked force is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Several authors have attempted to quantitatively 
show the advantage of a networked force with varying 
results.  The bibliography and reference sections contains 
list of several books and papers that attempt to back up 
this claim.  A few qualitative advantages are listed below. 
a. Lateral Collaboration 
The forces presented above laterally collaborated 
at many levels.  The Tactical Commanders were able to set 
up ad hoc connections between their CTNs so that they could 
laterally collaborate when necessary.  When the request for 
a cruise missile came in from the reconnaissance team, the 
MEU CO was able to laterally collaborate with the CSG CO 
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for a shooting asset and for deconfliction of the flight 
path.  Platoons and companies could directly connect their 
LTNs to laterally collaborate as needed.  Platoons from 
different companies could connect directly, agree on a 
course of action, and automatically update their intentions 
up the chain of command.  There was no requirement for 
either company commander or the battalion commander to 
directly get involved with the collaboration, but they each 
were automatically informed about the new course of action 
and could take action as necessary.  Because higher echelon 
commanders retain command oversight, the MEU CO was able to 
step in and prevent Bravo Company’s action from tipping 
into chaos.  By reigning in the authority to act by the 
platoon commanders, the MEU CO was able to maintain 
coherency of his forces. 
b. Speed of Command 
Alberts, Gartska and Stein define speed of 
command as “the time it takes to recognize and understand a 
situation (or change in the situation), identify and assess 
options, select an appropriate course of action, and 
translate in to actionable orders.”56  The four-tier model 
offers several ways to increase speed of command. 
The CTP is updated in real time and each user has 
the option to design individual views.  The CTP also 
contains both raw and processed data so that users have 
access to the most recent and relevant information at all 
times.  The MEU Commander was able to quickly recognize 
that Bravo Company was drifting into separate units unable 
to defend the access road.  Likewise the Third Platoon 
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Commander could quickly see that the insurgents he routed 
were retreating into another company’s sector. 
Having access to the original plan and the 
current disposition of friendly forces allowed each 
commander to quickly identify potential courses of action.  
Since all players are operating from the same picture, 
lateral collaboration toward a new course of action can be 
made quickly.  Also, once orders are issued, they can be 
easily understood and quickly disseminated. 
2. Four-Tier Model and NCW 
The four-tier model for an information topology of 
FORCEnet takes advantage of the potential power of NCW.  
Alberts, Gartska, and Stein say that the power of NCW is 
achieved by “linking together – or networking – battlespace 
entities.”57  The four-tier model allows all players to have 
a potential direct connection without the need for open 
channels between every node.  The network of networks 
structure also allows each command echelon to establish a 
unique network tailored to its needs without requiring the 
hardware and software overhead of managing all users on one 
system.  Because each local network is directly connected 
to several other networks, the design has built-in 
redundancy and robustness of communication.  No single node 
can ever be a critical node that shuts down the network, 
and users who are separated from the rest of the network 
can still function with data stored at their location. 
F. SUMMARY 
The above scenario illustrates how information would 
move through the four-tier network.  The ability to 
laterally collaborate is allowed by direct ad hoc 
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connections between networks, and command oversight 
prevents the collaborating units from drifting into chaos.  
Although an example of swarming forces was not used, the 
same processes that allow lateral collaboration will also 
provide a swarming capability.  In Chapter II, Alberts’ and 
Hayes’ assumptions for self-synchronization were listed as: 
• Clear and consistent understanding of 
command intent; 
• High quality information and shared 
situational awareness; 
• Competence at all levels of the force; and 
• Trust in the information, subordinates, 
superiors, peers, and equipment.58 
The second assumption is the only one that can be solved 
with a technological solution, and is met by the four-tier 
model.  Clear understanding of command intent can only take 
place in the mind.  The best any information system can do 
is to provide clear information in the proper format and 
context, and this is facilitated by the four-tier model.  
The last two assumptions can only be accomplished through 
training and effective use of the system. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The four-tier model presented above was designed to 
define an information topology that employs the principles 
of Network Centric Warfare.  The network-of-networks design 
allows for an easily scalable structure built from 
interchangeable pieces.  Every layer of the network can be 
viewed as a collection of nodes with each node being a 
distinct network itself.  This layering of networks 
eliminates any critical nodes upon which the entire design 
relies.  This design also provides a degree of autonomy for 
each network by allowing the owner of each network the 
authority to configure it to his needs.  The four-tier 
model also provides a set of default communications 
pathways with the ability for user to make direct 
connections when necessary. 
For this type of system to work, it requires a command 
and control philosophy designed to maximize the flexibility 
and responsiveness of a Network Centric force.  Adaptable 
Command and Control (AC2) provides one method for doing 
this.  AC2 seeks to maximize the flexibility of military 
organizations by allowing lateral collaboration at the edge 
of the organization.  In addition, AC2 retains the 
traditional command roles that some have attempted to 
remove from self-synchronizing units.  With AC2, senior 
commanders have the specific responsibility of overseeing 
lateral collaboration to ensure that subordinates are 
acting in concert with stated goals.  AC2 also provides a 
set of rules and criteria that units can train to and 
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understand so that forces attempting to conduct NCW will 
have a common foundation on which to operate. 
The four-tier model has one other important property; 
it is testable.  This design is a specific instantiation of 
a FORCEnet information topology that can be modeled, 
simulated, and tested.  Future modeling and simulation will 
aid developers in identifying and correcting shortfalls in 
the design and fielding of a superior product in the end.  
Before this type of design can be implemented, many 
technological concerns need to be addressed.  Some are 
addressed specifically below, and others were highlighted 
in Chapter II. 
B. TECHNOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Ad Hoc Networking 
Ad hoc networking is defined as “a collection of 
wireless mobile hosts forming a temporary network without 
the aid of any centralized administration or standard 
support services.”59  The four-tier model relies heavily on 
ad hoc networking to connect forward units into the 
network.  Many companies have fielded local ad hoc 
networking capabilities, but no networks have been fielded 
on the scale of the FORCEnet network.  Additional advances 
in routing protocols, pathway identification, and 
addressing algorithms still need to be developed and tested 
before the four-tier model can be fielded.  In addition, 
more advanced computing and data transmission systems are 
needed to field this network. 
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a. Storage and Processing 
The four-tier model presented in Chapter III 
assumes the availability of small, powerful computer 
processors and data storage components for forward units.  
Units deployed at permanent or semi-permanent installations 
or on ships will have the potential to access adequate 
computing and power sources.  Some information technology 
companies and universities have made promising advances in 
the area of small-scale, powerful computing and storage 
systems (see Chapter II, Section C), but no products have 
been developed to meet the needs of the four-tier model.  
Forward units need to have a man-portable system that can 
receive datalink communications, process data, display 
information in a usable format, determine if data meets the 
requirement of a standard or on-request information 
exchange, and transmit the data as appropriate.  In order 
to reduce bandwidth requirements, more information needs to 
be stored and processed at the forward edges of the network 
so that less raw data needs to be transmitted.  The ability 
to store necessary information forward, such as copies of 
the CTP or mission orders, allows units to continue to 
operate effectively when denied access to the network. 
b. Transmission 
The amount of data exchanged between two wireless 
hosts is limited by a number of factors.  The most obvious 
is bandwidth, which limits the number of actual bits that 
can be exchanged60.  The amount of useful bits of 
information is far less than the number of bits 
transmitted.  Forward error correction, such as Hamming 
codes or turbo codes, sends redundant bits to compensate 
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for poor signal connectivity and is required whenever data 
is sent over a wireless connection61.  Stronger transmitting 
power can reduce the requirements for forward error 
correction but can never eliminate it.  Additionally, 
transmission power is a drain on portable power sources 
which can be expected to be at a premium for forward units.  
Data compression algorithms can squeeze more useful 
information into fewer bits of data.  These algorithms vary 
in their performance and usefulness,62 and no universal 
standards have been accepted although several protocols are 
used commercially.  Wireless bandwidth expansion, 
transmission power, and data compression standards need to 
be designed into the FORCEnet network in order to enable ad 
hoc networking in field environments. 
2. Data Fusion and Analysis 
The four-tier model rests on an assumption that all 
data residing on the network is of a commonly readable 
form.  In order for a common data format to exist, several 
problems need to be resolved by appropriate subject matter 
experts.  Many of these problems are beyond the scope of 
this work, but a few are presented here.  First, the system 
needs to have a mechanism for identifying redundancies in 
data.  If two units report the same, or nearly same, 
information, the system needs to be able to recognize and 
resolve the condition without simply double reporting the 
data.  This is not a trivial problem because two reports 
that are nearly identical may be reports on separate 
events, the same event, or the same event moving in time.  
When reports are fused, the time nature of the reporting as 
                     
61
 Ibid., 305-374. 
62
 See http://www.DataCompression.info for more information on data 
compression.  Last accessed September 2004. 
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well as the reliability of the source need to be kept 
intact so that analysts can determine which reports are 
relevant and which no longer apply. 
A second problem is determining the appropriate mix of 
human and autonomous analysts that should be involved in 
analyzing information.  Some sensors already rely heavily 
on computer-aided analysis.  For example, a radar system 
that rejects clutter and an infrared seeker which rejects 
flares both rely on algorithms to determine what is a 
potential target and what is not.  It is not difficult to 
conceive of advanced computer-aided systems in the near 
future that can make similar determinations quickly on the 
battlefield.  This capability has the potential to be 
extremely advantageous or catastrophic depending on the 
environment in which it operates.  The mix of humans and 
automatic analysis aids needs to be determined clearly when 
these aids become available in order to ensure that the 
maximum benefit can be gained. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Modeling and Simulation 
Before any project of this magnitude can be developed, 
appropriate models need to be built to show that the basic 
design will work.  The four-tier model lends itself to 
modeling partially because its scale-free nature fits an 
understood and developing field of network theory.  Also, 
the design has well-defined rules that can be designed into 
a model.   
AC2 needs to be further explored to determine if the 
lateral collaboration and command oversight construct is 
sufficient to provide flexibility and coherency of forces.  
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This design could be easily wargamed as a start and 
eventually worked into a field exercise at a small scale. 
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